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Abstract
This study forms part of a project investigating the relationships among the formal structure
of aviation procedures, the ways in which the crew members are taught to execute them, and
the ways in which they are actually performed in flight. Specifically this report examines the
interactions between the performance of checklists and interruptions, considering both
interruptions by radio communications and by other crew members. The data consist of 14
crews' performance of a full mission simulation of a commercial Boeing 707 flight. The
results show that good crews have a higher ratio of checklist speech acts to all speech acts
within the span of the performance of the checklist. Further, it is not number of
interruptions but length of interruptions which is associated with crew quality. Use of
explicit holds is also associated with high crew quality.
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1 Introduction
This study is part of a larger project investigating the relationships among the formal
structure of aircraft procedures, the ways in which crew members are taught to execute
them, and the ways in which they are actually performed in flight. Specifically, this report
examines the interaction between the performance of checklists and interruptions,
considering both interruptions by radio communications and by other crew members. This
study is an exploratory one, intended to show that a study of checklist interruption can be a
valuable tool to suggest possible changes in aircrew training. In order to do this, we have
developed a number of linguistic and interactional variables with which to investigate
checklists. These can be used to study tlie ways in which aircrews actually perform
checklists, and to demonstrate ways in which training and practice do not match. It should
be noted that in situations of mismatch, it is not necessarily the case that further training is
necessary. It may be that the actual practice of crew members is preferrable to the actions
recommended by the training process. This is an empirically testable question, and should
not be decided a priori.
1.1 Motivation
Prior research at NASA Ames Research Center indicated that patterns of communication
among crewmembers in the cockpit are a significant factor in air carrier accidents: (Ruffell-
Smith, 1979) (Foushee and Manos, 1981), (Goguen and Linde, 1983), (Murphy, 1980), and
(Murphy et al, 1984). Therefore, additional research on aviation communication patterns
could provide the basis for changes in training crew members, and formulating aviation
procedures. The current research investigates specific patterns of communication involved in
checklists which may contribute to such accidents.
1.2 Choice of Cheekilsta
Of all cockpit communications patterns, formally specified procedures may represent the
most important way that flightcrews accomplish the communications and actions necessary
for mission completion. In fact, procedures specify not only what actions are to be taken,
but also the ordering of these actions, and the communications required among crew
members to coordinate them. Moreover, since procedures are well defined and highly
constrained, they provide a focal point for studying how crews actually interact and to what
extent they follow specified forms.
The procedures involved in commercial aviation include checklists, briet'mgs, and callouts.
2Of this array of procedures, we focus on checklists. Checklists may be defined as a specified
list of actions to be performed in a challenge and response manner. For normal checklists,
the actions are checks of activities already performed, rather than immediate performances
of those actions. Checklists have been chosen for study, for the following reasons:
1. Complexity. Of all procedures, checklists involve the most complex interactions
among crew members, and are the most closely related to crew coordination. Hence a
study of how they are actually handled by crew members is of the greatest interest.
2. Frequency. There are more types and instances of checklists than any other type of
procedure. The existence of multiple instances, both within and across crews increases
the comparabilty of the data.
3. Documentation. The Aircraft Operating Manuals of the two airlines consulted for
this project offer the most complete specification of checklists.
4. Relation to previous work. Checklist structure is directly related to previous work
on planning (Linde and Goguen, 1978, Goguen and Linde, 1983, Goguen, Linde and
Murphy, 1984). This provides a convenient theoretical framework within which to
carry out an analysis, as well as direct continuity with previous work.
5. Relevance to crew eoordlnatlon. Progress in understanding checklists is relevant to
understanding crew coordination, since scheduling and executing checklists involves
resource managment, crew communication, and scheduling.
1.8 Cholee of Intersetional Aspeets
There are a number of questions involved in checklist performance. One important issue is
the relationship between normative statements of how checklists should be performed, and
the ways in which crew members do perform them. Such a focus leads to the following kinds
of question: What is the accuracy of actual checklist performance? That is, do crew
members carry out the checklists in the form prescribed by the Aircraft Operations Manual
of their airline? The discovery of problems in this area could lead to recommendations that
crews be more extensively trained in following the prescribed form or that the form be
changed, if it were shown to cause problems. Another issue concerns the accuracy of
responses and the reasons for inaccuracy. When crew members make a response to a
checklist query, is that response correct? Since human error of this type is always to be
expected, a discovery that crew members were making a sizeable number of these errors
would lead to recommendations that training place a greater emphasis on crew concept, so
that a second crew member always checks the accuracy of such responses. These are
extremely important questions, which are currently under study by other NASA projects.
Therefore the current study focuses on a third issue: The types and effects of interactions
3between checklist performance and other activities. As discussed in Section 2, the normative
statement of how checklists should be performed is that crew members should never allow
checklist performance to be interrupted, whether by interaction with Air Traffic Control, or
by other cockpit concerns, except in the case of actual emergency situations, which then
require additional checklists, embedded within the normal checklist. (See the appendix for a
discussion of this type of embedding.) This rule is given both in Aircraft Operations
Manuals, and in the course of crew training. Although the rule is stated strongly, with little
provision for exceptions, in practice, we find frequent interruptions of both types. This
report defines a number of interruption types and measures of interruption, and investigates
the degree of compliance with the rules of checklist performance, and the relationship
between noncompliance and crew safety performance.
2 Interactive Aspects of Checklist Performance
This section discusses the normative form of checklist performance,
interrruptions which may occur in its course.
and the types of
2.1 Normative Checklist Performance
Resource management training suggests that checklists should be performed without
interruption. Checklists should not be scheduled until other pressing crew concerns have
been dealt with, so that the checklist performance can proceed without interruption. This is,
indeed, a major aspect of resource management for the pilot flying. Furthermore, if there is
a radio transmission to the crew, it is to be ignored until the completion of the checklist. If
the pilot flying chooses to respond, the correct procedure is to place an explit hold on the
checklist, by saying, "Hold it at name of checklist item."
These procedures for handling checklist performance are given by the Aircraft Operating
Manual of a major commercial airline, hereafter referred to as Airline A. (We quote this
manual rather than the Aviation Training Institute manual used in the simulator experiment,
since the ATI manual does not give an explicit statement of how checklists are to be
performed.) Note that the same rules apply for most or all other commercial airlines.
The pilot flying will request the remaining checklists at the proper time. The flight
engineer is not to initiate a checklist, but he should remind the pilot flying if he feels
the request for it is overdue.
A checklist normally should not be started until sufficient time and attention can be
devoted to its expeditious completion.
4Do not skip items. If the captain elects not to accomplish an item on the checklist at
that time, he will say, =Hold the checklist at the • When the
captain says mContinue the checklist, = the reading of the checklist will continue just as
though there had been no interruption.
The particular equipment used by the various airlines will dictate how the hold is
implemented. Possibilities include cards, manual pages, mechanical scrolls, and computer
displays, each of which have different mechanisms for place holding.
2.2 Self Interruption
One possible source of interruption is the crew itself. That is, crew members may choose to
interrupt their performance of the checklist in order to deal with other cockpit concerns, to
discuss information just gathered from the radio, or to discuss checklist items in an informal
manner. Section 4.1 discusses the correlation of such interruptions with poor safety
performance. We would expect to find such an effect, since interruption of a checklist places
a greater load on memory. Crew members must deal with the interruption, while
remembering both the fact that they were performing a check list, and also the identity of
the last checklist item they had completed. Furthermore, some member of the crew must
make the decision to attempt a resumption of the checklist.
As we have seen, the normative procedure for dealing with interruption is to place an explicit
hold on the checklist if the crew must deal with any cockpit concern other than the checklist.
If this is done, the load on memory may not be as great, since placing such a hold makes a
social acknowledgement of the fact that the checklist has been interrupted. On the other
hand, social acknowledgement of the hold may actually dilute the responsibility for
resumption, since each crewmember may believe that another crewmember will take the
responsibility of resuming the checklist.
In an earlier stage of this project, we studied the formal structure of checklists, and found
that they are tree structured plans. In this system, a formal hold on a checklist constitutes a
POP marker, that is , an indication that the focus of attention for the discussion has moved
out of the plan, with an associated marker of where to return to. {See the appendix for a
fuller discussion of this structure.)
52.3 Radio Interruption
Another source of interruption is radio transmission, either to the crew, or to or from
another aircraft. The crewmembers have two choices in this situation. They may continue
their performance of the checklist during the radio transmission. In this case, we may
assume either that the crewmembers are not listening to the radio, or that they are
attempting to attend to both the radio and the checklist. This may temporarily increase their
workload, and may increase the likelihood of error in one or both tasks. Or, they may
interrupt their performance of the checklist in order to listen to the radio. Such an
interruption may be either unmarked, or marked with an explicit hold. We also note that an
interruption to listen to or respond to the radio is often followed by conversation between
crew members of the information gathered from the radio, thus extending the period of the
interruption.
3 Choice of Data
The data for this study comes from a full mission simulation of a commercial Boeing 707
flight. (See (Murphy el ai, 1984) for a description of this project.) This section describes the
scenario of this simulation, and the choice of data from the scenario.
3.1 The Scenarlo
The simulation scenario represented a flight from Tucson to Phoenix, continuing to Los
Angeles. Each crew flew the scenario once, with no prior knowledge of the problem that was
to be introduced. The scenario was designed to produce a series of overlapping problems.
First, the crew was given a hold at the Peris intersection in order to burn fuel reserves.
After a hold at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), an indication that the nose gear
was not down and locked forced a missed approach on the landing. This situation was
exacerbated because it occurred at a time when the entire Los Angeles basin, including
possible alternate airports (e.g. Ontario (ONT) and Long Beach (LGB)) was experiencing low
and deteriorating ceilings due to incoming coastal fog. After the missed approach, the crews
performed the gear check procedure to determine that the gear was down and pinned; this
procedure permitted them to assume that the panel light indication was faulty. The crews
were then required to choose an alternate airport; deteriorating weather suggested that only
Palmdale and Ontario might be open. The decision was not a clear one: while Palmdale
had better weather than Ontario, it is not equipped with commercial passenger handling
facilities.
6While on the ground at Phoenix (PHX), the crew was given weather information indicating
some degradation at LAX. During the latter part of the cruise to Los Angeles, they were
given direct information and other cues about the further deterioration of the ceiling and
runway visual range at LAX. These cues included the hold at Peris due to traffic backup,
and a conversation between ATC and another aircraft about its missed approach at LAX
and its return for a second attempt. By requesting weather conditions at possible alternates,
the crews could determine that conditions at other coastal airports (such as Long Beach
(LGB)) were similar to LAX, while Ontario (ONT), which is located inland from LAX was
behind LAX in weather and visibility deterioration, and that Palmdale (PMD), located over a
mountain range out of the Los Angeles basin, had good weather with clear visibility.
$.2 The Simulator and Crew
The scenario was flown in a Boeing 720B flight training simulator, a late version of the
Boeing 707, which was leased from Aviation Training Institute. A current, professional air
traffic controller was used in the simulation. Crew members in the simulation were paid
volunteers, whose experience represented a wide range of airline of origin and recency or
currency on 13-707 linde operations. Some were current on the B-707, others had recent
13-707 experience but were currently flying other jet aircraft in line operations, and some
were retired. Crew composition ranged from one crew in which all members were retired
from line flight, to one crew which was currently flying the B-707 as an intact crew. All
crewmembers received six hours of classroom differences training and four to eight hours of
simulator differences training. The number of hours of simulator differences training which
a crewmember received was based on recency. Subjects were formed into crews before the
simulator training and were instructed in coordinated procedures during this training.
3.3 Choice of Data for the Present Analyals
All cockpit communications during the second part of the scenario, the flight from Phoenix
to Los Angeles, were transcribed. However only 14 of the 16 flights were used, because the
other two transcriptions were not available at the time of the linguistic coding.
In order to study the widest range of checklist execution, checklists from both normal and
problem segments of the flight from Phoenix to Los Angeles were sampled, and checklists
performed both on the ground and in the air were included, since workload demands appear
to differ radically in these conditions. Checklists which were performed explicitly by all the
crews were selected, since many crews omitted explicit verbal performance of one or more
checklists. Table 1 shows the checklists performed by each crew. The three checklists
7chosenfor analysiswere the afterstart checklist,which is performed while still on the ground,
the instrument approach checklist, and the prelanding checklist.
Note that some checklists were performed more than once, since the scenario forced a go-
around at LAX. Also note that many checklists were omitted, even by crews given high
ratings in safety performance. Contrary to expectations, there appears to be no relation
between crew quality and number of checklists performed.
Checklists
Performed Crew Number
1 2 3 4 6 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 16
Before Start 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Starting Engines 1 i 1 1 1 1 1 I I 0 1 1 0 1
Afterstart 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Waveoff 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
Before Takeoff 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Climb 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 ? 1 1 1 1 2 0
Inrange 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 2 3 2 1
Instrument Approach 2 2 2 1 3 2 2 1 ? 2 3 3 1 2
Prelanding 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 3 ? 1 3 3 1 1
Afterlanding 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
Parking 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 ? 0 1 1 1 0
AC Terminating 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0
Totals 12 11 11 10 13 12 12 13 9 e 16 18 13
Table 1: Number of Cheeklists Performed by Each Crew
The checklists used in the flights were those provided by Aviation Training Institute, the site
of the simulator. Because the subjects came from a number of different airlines, the forms
most familiar to them could not be used. All crewmembers received preflight training to
familiarize them with this form.
There were a number of instances in which crews began a checklist, but did not finish it.
These cases were not coded, since it is impossible to determine exactly the exact point at
which the checklist was abandoned. Hence, it was impossible to determine the total number
of speech acts. Table 2 shows the number of checklists performed by each crew, and
indicates the variation between crews.
CREW
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Table 2:
C_W
UNCOMPLETED CHEC_IST RANK
Instrument Approach 2
Instrument Approach 12
Instrument Approach
Preluding
Instrument Approach 8
Prelsndtng
Instrument Approach II
Instrument Approach 10
Uncompleted Checklists, by Crew
4 Variables
Several methods were devised to measure the interaction of checklist performance with other
activities: the continuity ratio of checklists, the treatment of interruptions, and the
treatment of resumptions.
4.1 Continuity Ratio
The performance of a checklist defines a checklist span: the period of time between the
first call for the checklist and the conclusion of the checklist. Within the checklist span, we
may consider the continuity ratio: the ratio of checklist speech acts to the total number of
speech acts within the checklist span. Checklist speech acts are only those utterances which
form part of the challenge/response checklist form specified by the Aircraft Operating
Manual. They do not include either discussion about when or whether the checklist should
be performed or speech acts which discuss checklist topics in a form not given by the
Aircraft Operating Manual, which are viewed as interruptions to the checklist.
4.2 Interruptions and Resumptions
As already discussed, there may be one or more interruptions within a given checklist, either
by the radio, or by the crew themselves. For the codable checklists there are the same
number of interruptions and resumptions.
94.3 Identity of Crew Member Requesting Resumption
Once a checklist is interrupted, it may be resumed by any crew member. Airline procedures
do not specify who is required to resume it. The identity of the crew member requesting
resumption is of great interest, since it shows who is taking responsibility for this aspect of
resource management. We have coded the identity of the crew member requesting the
resumption: Pilot Flying, Pilot Not Flying, or Second Officer.
4.4 Radio Interruptions
There are four possible ways in which a radio transmission may interrupt checklist
performance. These are:
1. Radio to Crew Overlap. This variable represents the number of speech acts in a
radio transmission to the crew which overlap the performance of the checklist. (That
is, the crew continues the performance of the checklist while ATC is addressing them.
A simultaneous utterance of more than one word is coded as an overlap.)
2. Radio to Other Overlap. This variable represents the number of speech acts in a
radio transmission to or from any other aircraft which overlap the performance of the
checklist. (That is, the crew continues the performance of the checklist during radio
traffic between ATC and other aircraft.)
3. Radio to Crew Interrupt. This variable represents the number of speech acts in a
radio transmission to the crew which interrupts the performance of the checklist.
(That is, the crew interrupts the performance of the checklist to listen to a radio
transmission directed to them by ATC.)
4. Radio to Other Interrupt. This variable represents the number of speech acts in a
radio transmission to or from any other aircraft which interrupt the performance of the
checklist. (That is, the crew interrupts the performance of the checklist during radio
traffic between ATC and other aircraft.)
Note that although it is logically possible to have a crew intiated radio transmission which
interrupts the performance of the checklist, in practice we find no such examples.
4.5 Safety Performanee Variable
In order to understand the effects of variation in checklist performance, performance on one
or more activities must be measured to distinguish effective from ineffective crews.
Unfortunately, such performance variables are currently not available in reliable form.
Other analyses performed on this data (Murphy and Awe, 1985), provide a number of
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variables derived from a study in which six professionally active retired captains rated
videotapes of the simulated flights on a number of crew coordination and decision-making
variables. The raters were six retired captains, all of whom are currently employed as
analysts or researchers by the NASA/Aviation Safety Reporting System. The raters recieved
three 2-hour training sessions, which included an explanation of the rating system zmd the
problems of rating, trial rating runs, and discussion of the trials.
Of the variables included in the peer rating study, the one that seems most appropriate for
the present study is safety performance. It is the closest of the measures to a single objective
(or near-objective) measure of the quality of overall crew performance. The safety
performance variable reflects the raters' assessments of the risk involved in a given crew's
solution to the major scenario problem. The judgment of the level of safety performance
includes the choice of airport for landing was made, the amount of fuel on board at landing,
and the altitudes reached during below minimum approaches when the runway was not
visible.
There are two ways in which such a measure of crew performance can be assessed. The first
is to validate it against objective measures of performance such as error rates, fuel on
landing, and so forth. Such comparisons have not yet been undertaken. The second is to
examine correlations among the set of peer rating variables, to learn how highly
intercorrelated the safety performance judgments were among the raters and whether they
are associated with other ratings of crew performance. These relationships have been
examined by (Murphy and Awe, 1985). Inter-rater reliability for safety performance
judgments is extremely high (r=.99), indicating that it is appropriate to sum and average the
ratings on this dimension. Ratings on other dimensions are also highly reliable. However, an
examination of intercorrelations among mean ratings reveals that judged safety performance
is significantly associated (dr--14, p(.05) with only two other dimensions. 1 Moreover
without objective validation, the extent to which these associations are affected by artifacts
in the peer review method is unclear.
Given the problems with ratings of safety performance, we must treat it as a variable of
unknown quality whose validity at present is uncertain. It is used here for exploratory
purposes because no other, more fully validated, measure is available at this time.
1While (Murpby and Awe, 1985) report all intercorrelations between rating variables to be significant, their
findings assume 90 degrees of freedom. However assessingrelationships between these varisbles for the 16
crews requires rust combining the rstings from the 6 judges on each; the resulting degreesof freedom for each
obtained correlation is 14. This reanalysis yieMs only two significant correlations between Safety Performance
and any or the other variables; these are Decision Quality and Decision Eff_iency.
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5 Results
This section describes the testing of a number of hypotheses using the checklist performance
variables discussed in Section 4.
5.1 Continuity Ratio and Checklist Performance
The hypothesis is that good crews have a higher continuity ratio in their checklist
performance. This hypothesis tests the explicit instruction that checklists take priority over
all other cockpit acitivities. If this instruction is correct, it should mean that indeed the
better crews have a higher continuity ratio, because they permit fewer and shorter
interruptions of their checklist performance.
5.1.1 Computation of Continuity Ratio
In order to test this hypothesis, we must determine the continuity ratio for each crew.
The continuity ratio is computed as follows:
Number of Checklist Speech Acts in Checklist Span
Number of All Speech Acts in Checklist Span
Note that in computing this ratio, we have used only those checklists in our sample
performed while in the air (the Instrument Approach and Prelanding checklists), since the
checklist performed while on the ground (the Mterstart checklist) was interrupted rarely and
there was very little variance between crews. Checklist speech acts include only those speech
acts which accomplish the checklist in the challenge/response manner prescribed by the
checklist; however, variations in the wording of the challenge or response are not considered.
The total of all speech acts in the checklist span includes checklist speech acts, meta-
checklist speech acts, nonstandard checklist speech acts, radio speech acts by the crew, by
ATC to the crew and to other aircraft, and by other aircraft, and discussions by the crew of
nonchecklist topics. (It would be interesting and valuable to study the patterning of each of
these types separately, but the present data set is not large enough to support this.)
As mentioned in Section 2.1, a checklist may contain an explicit hold. If such an explicit
hold is used, the speech acts between the explicit hold and the resumption of the checklist
are not counted as part of the total of the checklist span. The reason for this is that an
explicit hold may be considered to be a formal suspension of a checklist, rather than an
12
iuterruption of it. 2
A number of checklists contain material at the end that is to be performed silently by the
flight engineer. When he has concluded these silent items, he announces that the checklist is
complete. We have not counted as part of the checklist span speech acts coming between
the last checklist item to be performed aloud in challenge/response fashion and the explicit
announcement of the end of the checklist, since no further attention to the cheklist is
necessary for other crew members. We have, however, counted it as part of the checklist
span if the flight engineer read this material aloud.
5.1.2 Testing the Hypothesis
The safety performance variable discussed in Section 4.5 ranks crews on a seven point scale.
The ranking on this scale was used to divide the 14 crews into the top and bottom seven.
rl':_l,le 2 shows the continuity ratios for the 14 crews.
TOP CREWS BOTTOM CREWS
Crew Safety Interruption Crew Safety Interruption
Perf. Ratio Perf. Ratio
Mean Mean
1 6.0
2 5.33
3 3.67
4 5.33
7 4.67
9 2.83
16 6.33
Table 3:
75 5 1.17
61 6 1.5
52 8 1.83
33 tO 1.83
78 il 2.67
67 12 2.67
52 13 2.33
Continuity
.49
58
47
12
51
45
53
Ratios for Top and Bottom Groups of Crews
The Mann-Whitney U statistic is used to test whether the differences between the two groups
were significant. This test yields U--10, p----.036. The hypothesis is therefore accepted. In
fact, the actual probability might have been higher, since the exigencies of the coding system
eliminated some of the lowest continuity ratios by eliminating those checklists which could
not be coded because they were interrupted and not resumed. As table 2 shows, with one
exeption, crews which have uncompleted checklists have scores which fall in the lower half of
the safety performance scale.
2This interpretation is supported both by the the Aircraft Operations Manual discussion of checklist
performance cited in Section 2.1, and by discussion with Captain Jack Raabe, a retired Pan American Airlines
check pilot now at the Batelle Institute.
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5.2 Comparison of Number of Interruptions with Interruption Ratio
It might be argued that the total number of interruptions is the crucial factor in checklist
peformance, rather than the interruption ratio. That is, three interruptions of five speech
acts each may be as bad or worse than interruption one of fifteen speech acts. We can test
this by computing the ratio of the number of interruptions to the number of checklists
performed. (This ratio provides a necessary normalization, since not all crews peformed the
same number of checklists.)
As in the previous hypothesis, the safety performance variable is used to divide the crews
into the top and bottom seven. Table 3 shows the ratios for the 14 crews.
TOP CREWS BOTTOMCRE|S
Crew Safety Interruption Crew Safety Interruption
Perf. Ratio Perf. Ratio
Mean Mean
1 8.0 -- 5 1
2 5.33 .75 6 1
3 3.67 1.0 8 1
4 6.33 .33 10 1
7 4.87 .20 11 2
9 2.83 -- 12 2
8 8.33 .20 13 2
17 .67
5 .67
83 .25
83 2.0
67 .20
67 .25
33 .50
Table 4: Ratio of Number of
Interruptions to Number of Checklists Performed
The Mann-Whitney U statistic is again used to compare the two groups. This test yields
U--19, p --.5. The hypothesis is therefore rejected, and we conclude that number of
interruptions is not a factor which differentiates good and poor crews.
5.3 Identity of Crew Member Resuming Checklist
When a checklist is interrupted, someone must resume it. The crew member calling for the
resumption may be the pilot flying, the pilot not flying, or the second officer. Effective
e
resource management would dictate that the pilot flying should call for the resumption, since
he is the one who should remember that the checklist was suspended, and must attend to the
the fact that the checklist has been suspended, and to determining a suitable time to resume
it. Table 4 shows the ratio of resumptions by the pilot flying to all resumptions in
interrupted checklists.
14
Cri! St_ety Resumption by
Perf. Pilot Flyin K
Mesm
_eemptton by
Pilot Not Flytn K
tesuption by
Flight hg.
Regunptton
htto for
Pilot FlytnE
1 6.0 ......
2 6.33 2 0 2
3 3.67 0 0 3
• 6.33 0 1 0
7 •.67 1 0 0
9 2.63 ......
16 6.33 0 0 1
m_
.6
0
0
1
m_
0
6 1.17 2 0 2
6 1.6 0 0 3
8 1.83 1 0 O
10 1.83 0 O 2
11 2.67 0 1 0
12 2.67 0 0 1
13 2.33 1 O 1
.6
0
1
0
0
0
.6
Tot&Z 7 2 16
Table 6: Ratio of' Resumptions by Pilot Flying to All Resumptions
Using the Mann-Whitney U test to compare resumptions in good and poor crews, as defined
by the safety performance measure, we obtain U=16.5, p _>1.0. We see that there is no
relation between which crew member resumed a checklist and safety performance, although
such a relation would be predicted by the fact that the Aircraft Operations Manual
prescribes that resumptions should be by the pilot flying. Note, however, that the lack of
signifcance may be the result of the number of tied ranks in the data. It is interesting,
however, to note that 63% of the resumptions were by the flight engineer, for both good and
poor crews, contrary to the instruction of the Aircraft Operations Manual.
6.4 Explicit Holds of Checklists
Correct checklist procedures require that the crew place an explicit hold at the next item to
be performed when a checklist is interrupted. That is, the pilot flying should say something
like "Let's hold it at [item]." Examples of explicit holds were surprisingly rare, and so the
number of instances is too small to permit statistical testing. However, note that the only
two crews which did use explicit holds are crew 16 (Rank = 1) and crew 2 (Rank = 3).
(Crew I (Rank -- 2) has no interruptions, and hence no occasion for explicit holds.) This
distribution suggests that in spite of training which specifies the use of explicit holds, only
15
the best crews followed this instruction. (It might be argued that this is a phenomenon
particular to the simulator situation. However, (Linde and Goguen, 1987) showed that in at
least some aspects, simulator crews appear to be on good behavior and more attentive to
proper procedure than they are during actual flight.)
5.5 Overlaps Versus Interrupts
We may now consider the distribution of radio interrupts and radio overlaps. As discussed
in Section 2.3, a radio transmission may occur while the crew is performing a checklist. In
this case, the crew may either continue with the checklist, thus treating the transmission as
an overlap, or they may suspend the checklist, treating it as an interrupt. As mentioned in
Section 2.1, the recommendation is that it be treated as an overlap; that is, the crew should
ignore the transmission, even if it is directed to them, until completing the checklist. Table 5
shows the numbers of interrupts and overlaps for each crew.
Crow
Number of
Overlaps
Nmsber of
Interrupts
1 2 0
2 1 0
3 1 1
• 2 2
5 a 5
6 S 1
7 l 1
8 1 0
9 0 0
10 0 1
11 2 0
12 4 0
13 a 2
18 6 2
Tot&l 37 15
Table O: Number of Overlaps and Interrupts for
Each Crew
Given the size of the data set, it is not possible to distinguish between the treatment of
overlaps and interrupts by good and bad crews. However, it is interesting to note that 28%
of the instances are treated by the crews as interrupts, which is contrary to training and to
normative policy on checklist preformance.
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0 Discussion and Conclusions
Our results demonstratethat good crews have high checklist continuity ratios. Furthermore,
it is not the number of interruptions, but the length of interruptions that is associated with
crew quality. This seems reasonable, since crew members cannot fully control the number of
interruptions, but they can exercise some control over how long the interruptions lasL That
is, a crew has control over its own interruptions of s checklist, but not over radio
transmissions. However, crew members can control whether they discuss a radio
transmission or whether they immediately return to the checklist. Likewise, when some
other matter requires immediate attention, the crew has control over whether they place an
explicit hold on the checklist, or whether they interrupt the checklist to discuss that matter,
without making an explicit decision to hold and then return to the checklist. This difference
between the number and length of interruptions suggests that a greater burden may be
placed on the memory by one long interruption than by several short ones.
The data suggested that only the best crews used explicit holds to suspend the checklist. An
explicit hold is a linguistic device which changes the social status of an interruption. If the
explicit hold is used, the crew members have a linguistic acknowledgement that the pilot
flying has turned from the checklist to some other matter of concern, but intends to return.
Without an explicit hold, crew members are not certain of whether the checklist has been
interrupted or abandoned. In terms of the formal model of checklists given in the appendix,
a checklist may be seen as a tree-structured plan. Execution of such a plan involves a
movement of the crewmembers' focus of attention as they proceed through the checklist. An
explicit hold corresponds to a POP marker, an explicit indication that the focus of attention
has moved from some point within the tree, indicating some item on the checklist, to the top
node of the tree, indicating a shift in the focus of attention to something other than the
checklist. Other studies of traversal of large-scale linguistic structures have shown that such
large, non-sequential movements require explicit linguistic marking (Linde and Goguen,
1978). In the case of checklists, the formal theory provides a description of the relation
between the explicit marking and the rest of the checklist.
It is now reasonable ask what value this line of investigation may have. There are several
possible types of application. One immediate goal is to develop measures for investigation of
checklist performance which go beyond simple questions of accuracy of response. Such
measures have been developed by this study, and can be applied easily to other types of
aviation data.
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The second potential application for this research is for crew training. At present, crew
training in checklist execution is focussed on doing the checklists precisely "by the book."
However, a review of interruptions and resumptions that occur in practice suggests situations
in which doing it by the book is not possible. This study found a number of instances in
which almost all crews did not do it by the book. These include ignoring the instructions to
pay no attention to radio transmissions while performing a checklist and to give checklist
performance priority over all other cockpit concerns.
These findings suggest that further investigation is needed to determine whether such
instructions are, in fact, correct and should be stressed more during training, or whether they
do not lead to optimum performance, and should be modified. Furthermore, the instruction
to mark an interruption with a formal and explicit hold was very rarely carried out. Again,
this suggests the need for further research to determine whether the instruction is justified,
and if so, how to develop more effective training procedures.
Another application of the measures developed by this study is the development of a simple
test of the nature and overall quality of crew interaction. That is, certain of the variables
proposed above, such as the average length of interruptions, may indicate the nature and
quality of crew interaction and coordination. Other variables, such as whether radio
transmissions overlap or interrupt checklist performance can serve as a measure of crew
attention to outside information. This interpretation of these variables can be checked by
correlations with variables of crew performance derived from a peer review method, from
objective studies of performance errors, or from studies using focus group techniques and
interviews to obtain the jugements of experienced flight crew members. If correlations are
found between these various types of measure, and the measures of checklist performance,
this could lead to a measure of crew interaction quality which which would be simpler and
less costly than large-scale linguistic or psychological studies.
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I. Appendix: The Formal Structure of
Checklists
Research has shown that the formal structure of checklists is best studied by viewing
checklists as plans, in the precise formal sense described in (Linde and Goguen, 1978,
Goguen and Linde, 1983). Just as it is possible to write a formal grammar to describe the
syntax of sentences of a given language, it is possible to specify a formal grammar for larger
units such as plans, or checklists. This appendix reviews the theory of discourse analysis
required for such description, gives the grammar of plans, and discusses the modification of
this grammar necessary to describe checklists.
1.1 Discourse Unit and Discourse Type
The larger units of language that are appropriate for the study of aviation communication
are called discourse units (see (Gognen and Linde, 1983, Goguen, Linde and Murphy, 1984)).
A discourse unit is a segment of spoken language, longer than a single sentence, having
initial and final boundaries that are socially recognizable, and having a formally definable
internal structure. (This definition generalizes the criteria given by (Labor, 1972) for the
narrative of personal experience.) A discourse type is a class of discourse units having the
same internal structure. Discourse types that have been studied include the narrative
(Labor, 1972), the spatial desciption (Linde, 1974, Linde and Labor, 1975), the joke (Sachs,
1974), small group planning (Linde and Goguen, 1978), explanation (Goguen, Weiner and
Linde, 1983), and the command and control speech act chain (Goguen and Linde, 1983).
There are a number of points to be made about these definitions:
1. Level of Unit. In the linguistic hierarchy, the discourse unit is immediately above the
sentence, and hence is composed of sentences.
2. Socially Reeognlsed Boundaries. The discourse unit has boundaries which are
recognized as such by the participants in the conversation. These boundaries are often
recognized through their stereotyped form; for example, They lived happily ever
s_ter, as the end of a fairy tale, It sQeas thQre was a ... as the beginning of a
joke, And that was it. as the end of a narrative. Or they may be recognized as
encoding a certain type of semantic information; for example, an abstract of a story,
summarizing its point, can serve as an initial boundary.
3. Formally Definable Internal Structure. Labor has given an account of the
structure of narrative which is, in effect, a phrase structure grammar (Labor, 1972).
Plans and reasoning have been described using transformational grammars in which the
transformations mirror the real-time additions, deletions, and modifications made by
19
speakers(Goguen,Weiner and Linde, 1983,Linde and Goguen, 1978). Such a grammar
defines a discour._._ type as the class of discourse units whose internal structure is
consistent with those tts_asformational rules.
It has been found that the most important discourse types in the study of crew
communication are planning, reasoning, and the command and control speech act chain.
Instances of narrative and pseudonarrative are also present in cockpit communications, but
they are used only in non-operationally relevant ways. Only planning has been found to be
directly relevant to the study of checklists, since checklists may be described as a specific
type of plan.
1.2 Theory of Planning
Small group planning plays a basic role in aviation discourse. Planning may be viewed as a
linguistic and interactional activity carried on by a group of people, rather than as an
individual mental activity carried on by a single person. The linguistic study of small group
planning (Linde and Goguen, 1978) has shown that the language used to accomplish planning
is a discourse type: It has an initial boundary, consisting of the statement of the goal which
the planning is intended to accomplish. It has a final boundary, which may consist of the
group's evaluation of the probable effects of the plan, or of their acceptance or rejection of
it. And it has a precise internal structure, consisting of members' proposals to add new
subplans, and to modify or replace parts of plans previously proposed by others.
Formally, the internal structure of a planning discourse unit is described as a sequence of
transformations on the plan being formed by the group. These transformations represent
the real-time effects of proposals by members to add, delete, or modify plan parts. (Note
that beginning a plan, by stating a goal, is also a transformation, in this case, a
transformation of addition.) The relations of logical subordination that hold among the plan
parts are represented by a tree structure. Figures I-1 and I-2 show a plan from the 1978
United Airlines accident near Portland, Oregon (NTSB, 1979). Its major goal, stated by the
fwst officer, is to call out the equliment, and his plan for this is to have the conpany
call. This PLAN/GOAL relationship is indicated in Figure I-l. In Figure I-2, the Captain
replaces the First Officer's plan with a plan to call dispatch in San Francisco. In
Figure 1-3, he adds a node indicating that m_int.nance down there will Imadle it that
way.
The order of application of transformations is the same as the order of production of clauses
CAM-2 He's going to h&ve
the conpany call
out the equtjmentY
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PL_/OOAL
/ \
/ \
have the cull out
company cull the equipment
CAM-1
CAM-1
FIKure I-1:
|e'll cull dleputch
in San Francisco
Figure 1-2:
and natntenance
down there wlll
handle it that
ny
(1764: 27)
A COAL/PL,_ Node
_aL/PL_
/ \
/ \
cull out ACT_R/SAY/TO
the equipment / I
/ I
we cull
Addition of an ACTOR/SAY/TO Node
aO_.£/PldO[
/ \
/ \
ct, ll out ACTOR/SAY/TO
the equllment / I
/ I
/ I (c&ll)
/ I
ACTOR/DO
/ \
/ \
n&lntenance
down there
\
\
\
\
dlsputch
In Ban
Francisco
\
\
Figure 1-8: Addition of an ACTOR/DO Node
in the text. However, the order of nodes in the tree may no longer correspond to the order
in which they were produced, if deletion or rearrangment transformations have been applied.
However, the present research on procedures requires only simple addition transformations;
see (Linde and Goguen, 1978) for a full list of transformations.
There are s number of relations of logical subordination which have been found in plans.
The first and most basic of these is the GOAL/PLAN relationship, which subordinates a plan
to an announced goal. Next is the AND relationship, which can subordinate any number of
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subplans or subgoals. There is also EXOR, for "(mutually) exclusive or," either of goals or of
plans; W/THEN, for a conditional plan or goal; and ACTORJT)O, with its special case
ACTOR/SAY/TO, in which some actor says something to some other. Finally, there are the
terminal nodes, which represent actions and goals which are not further logically
decomposed, but instead are fdled in with language produced by the speakers. Note that the
parts of compound nodes may be freely permuted, depending on the order in the text; thus,
we fred GOAL/PLAN and PLAN/GOAL, IF/THEN and THEN/IF, etc.
of all the subordinators found in previous research on planning.
GOAL/PLAN AND
I \ II \
I \ I I...\
See Figure I-4 for a display
EXOR
I \
I \
NOT _/_
/I \ I / \
/ I...\ I / \
AC'r0R/D0
I \
I \
oR ACTOR/SA¥/_
/I \ / I \
/I...\ / I \
Figure I-4: Subordinators Found in Pluning
1.2.1 Structural and Interactional Properties of Checklists
We now consider the checklists in the Aircraft Operations Manual of Airline A. There are
altogether 28 such checklists, 2 Normal (each with 6 named subprocedures), 12 Abnormal,
and 13 Emergency. One measure of their complexity is the number of nodes in the plan tree
describing them. Among the checklists having explicit Challenge/Response graphical
structure, this ranges in complexity from RUNAWAY TRIM, the simplest checklist with just
3 nodes, to ELECTRICAL SMOKE OR FIRE, by far the most complex checklist of Airline
A, with a total of 88 nodes. To indicate typical structures for these checklists, Figures I-5
and I-6 show respectively the plan trees of two of the Emergency Checklists, the Phase I
(memory items) of APU FIRE and (all of) ENGINE OVERHEAT.
The structure shown in Figure I-5, a SEQuence of Challenge/Response pairs, is particularly
characteristic of checklists. A Challenge/Response pair is indicated by a CH/R node; the
question of how to interpet these nodes in terms of the primitive node types given in the
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Handle Bottle
Figure IoSz APU FIRE Phase I Checklist
theory of planning is discussed in Section 4.2.1. For reference, we include the text for this
checklist:
Fire Handle
..................... PULL Fire Bottle ..................... DISCHARGE
The reader may have noticed that these plan trees do not a GOAL/PlAN root node; this is
because no explicit goal is indicated in the specification of this procedure in the AOM. The
default goal can be taken to be accomplishing a safe landing.
Having illustrated the most typical structures of checklists, a complete checklist is now
analyzed. Figure I-6 shows the complete structure of the simplest Emergency Checklist,
ENGINE OVERHEAT. Only the initial CHflt node is in Phase I; the rest represents Phase 11
checklist items. This checklist contains a Condition/Action node (indicated COND/ACTION);
this node type is common in Emergency/Abnormal checklists. The Aircraft Operations
Manual analyzed here uses a special notation for conditional actions. For example, the first
COND/ACTION node of Figure I-6 appears in the manual, with its Condition in boldface, as
follows:
• If overheat light goes out,
operate engine at reduced thrust.
Finally, the GOTO node in Figure I-6 indicates that if this point in the tree is reached in
executing the plan, then the designated checklist, ENGINE FIRE, should be executed.
s_
_IIR COb'D/ACTION (X}MDIACI'IDN/ \ / \ / \
Throttle IDLE overheat op eng overheat GOT0
light at reduced light I
goee out thrust ream:Jag ENGINE
on FIRE
Figure 1-6- ENGINE OVERHEAT Checklist
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1.2.2 Focus of Attention
In addition to the subordinators which are used to build up the tree, the description also
requires a mechanism to describe the focus of attention of the participants. We use a
pointer, which is a formal marker of position in the plan tree corresponding to the
participants' sense of "what we are doing now. m (Note that this pointer is part of the
abstract description of the process of planning. It may or may not have an equivalent in the
physical world, such as a crewmember's finger moving down the checklist, or a cursor on a
terminal display.) In general, the next transformation will apply at the node marked by the
pointer's current location.
Pointers may move as part of the application of some other transformation, or they may be
moved by a transformation whose only effect is the shift of focus of attention. All the
subordinators described in Section 1.2 have corresponding addition transformations, with the
effect of moving the pointer to the newly added node in the plan tree. This new node
becomes the current focus of attention, and the next transformation will apply at that node,
unless the focus, and thus the pointer, shifts to some previously added node. A
transformation which moves a pointer upward in the tree without adding a node to the tree
is called a POP transformation.
In ordinary discourse types, POPs may be indicated by such linguistic markers as "so,"
• well," "anyway, = "OK', and summaries of the preceding text. In checklist performance,
the normative indicator of a POP marker is a linguistic indication of explicit hold. This
indicates both that the social focus of attention has been moved to a task indicated by
another node, and that a return to the original task is intended.
1.2.8 Dependen©ies among Checklists
We now turn to the question of dependencies among checklists. One checklist depends
upon another if the first checklist requires the performance of the second when some
specified condition holds. This is formally indicated by a GOTO from the first checklist to the
second checklist, an instruction which requires the crew to go to the indicated checklist.
Such plan GOTOs are indicated in Figures I-7 and I-8. Theoretically, at least three forms of
dependency are possible: either the crewmembers interrupt their performance of the first
checklist in order to perform the second, and then return to it, or they continue with the
second checklist and do not return to the first, or or they are referred from an abnormal
checklist to a normal checklist with some actions of that checklist edited. The data we have
examined contain only the second case, which we may refer to as embedding.
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Normal checklists do not have a complex dependency structure. They do not embed other
normal checklists, although the response to a challenge in a normal checklist may be a report
of the performance of an individual checklist. Emergency/abnormal checklists may embed
other emergency checklists under certain designated conditions, or may unconditionally
require the performance of another emergency/abnormal checklist at a later time. Finally in
the most complex case, an abnormal checklist may refer to a normal checklist with some
actions of that checklist edited. The abnormal checklist which results from the edit may be
considered to depend on the altered normal checklist. (Altered items in the edited normal
checklist are indicated in the AOM of Airline A by shading, so that graphically, the normal
checklist, the abnormal checklist, and the relationship between them can be seen
simultaneously.) Figures I-7 and b8 show the formal structure of such dependencies.
ENGINE OVERHEAT SMOKE SOURCE ID
[ t
ENGINE FIRE A/C SMOKE IK.EC. SMOKE
I OR FIRE
One Engine Inop
SMOKE CONTROL:
CABIN OR COCKPIT
Figure LT:
Engine Shutdown
J
One Engine Inop
I
Landing: One Engine
Dependencies among Emergency Checklists
X Hydraulic Sys Failed
J
Landing: X Hydraulic Sys Failed
Inop
Not___es:X may be: 'Am; ibm; or CA° and tBe. Then
Landing: 'A' and "B' Hydraulic Sys Failed is Just
the Normal Landing Checklist.
Flgure I-8: Dependencies among Abnormal Checklists
It may be worth noting that some checklists explicitly indicate that they are never initial
checklists, that is, they can only be executed following execution of some prior checklist. For
example, the SMOKE CONTROL: CABIN OR COCKPIT emergency checklist begins with
Use Smoke Source Identification checklist first
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1.2.4 Summary and Diseuulon
Having considered the structure of checklists as plans, and added certain features to cover
plans that are executed in real tine, we may now ask whether checklists form a subcategory
of plans that is distinguishable by some particular structural properties. The answer is that
essentially, they do not. Checklists exhibit all the structural diversity of plans; there is no
plan structure found in the analysis of small group planning that is not also found in
checklists. Checklists do tend to have a preponderance of certain characteristic structures,
especially SEQ, COND/ACTION and CH/R nodes; EXOR nodes are rather rare (there are only
two in our data). However, this is a statistical, not a structural property.
The most important new node types, CH/R and COND/ACTION nodes, do not represent
additions to the basic theory of planning, since they have been analyzed in terms of the basic
plan node types, and thus they serve as abbreviations for complex interactionalstructures
that particularly common in aviation procedures. Another point of agreement between
checklistsand plans is the possibleembedding of explanations within them. We have several
examples of this in the Expanded Checklist Section of the'AOM. Perhaps the major
structuraldifference of the checklistsin our data from plans in other bodies of data that we
have studied (such as politicalplanning) isthe frequent omission of an explicitstatement of a
GOAL. Another difference is that some checklistshave explicitdependencies upon others.
This phenomenon is implicitin our theory of planning, but we had not found any examples,
since our previous small group planning data involved spontaneously generated plans,
whereas checklists are pre-set plans, to which the crew may refer as needed. Thus we
conclude that checklistscan be formally described as plans, and that such a description can
be used as a framework to guide the empirical investigationof checklistperformance.
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